Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment by Heller, Yuval
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Language, Meaning, and Games:
Comment
Yuval Heller
Oxford
29. August 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49455/
MPRA Paper No. 49455, posted 3. September 2013 08:53 UTC
Language, Meaning, and Games: A Comment
Yuval Heller∗(September 2, 2013)
Address: Nuffield College and Department of Economics, New Road, Oxford, OX1 1NF,
United Kingdom. Email: yuval26@gmail.com or yuval.heller@economics.ox.ac.uk.
Abstract
Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games
with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I demon-
strate that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small lying costs
per se. KEYWORDS: Lexicographic preferences, evolutionary stability, cheap talk. JEL: C73.
Demichelis & Weibull (2008) (henceforth, DW) study symmetric two-player n × n coor-
dination games in which each pure action is the best reply to itself, as demonstrated in the
game of Table 1. This game admits three pure strict equilibria: the Pareto-dominant (a, a),
and the Pareto-dominated (b, b) and (c, c). Intuition suggests that equilibrium (a, a) is more
plausible, especially if players can communicate before playing the game. However, all the
above-mentioned equilibria satisfy all the standard (non-evolutionary) refinements, even when
the game is extended to include a pre-play cheap-talk stage in which each player simultaneously
sends a message from a finite alphabet before playing the game.
Several papers use the refinement of evolutionary stability to study such games.1 A sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is an evolutionarily (neutrally) stable strategy if it is a strictly (weakly)
better reply to all other best replies than these are to themselves (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973;
Maynard Smith, 1982).2 The motivation for this notion is that a stable strategy, if adopted by
a population of players, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare.3
∗I express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Stefano Demichelis, Erik Mohlin, and Jo¨rgen Weibull for many
useful discussions.
1 Other papers use different evolutionary approaches to study coordination games, such as stochastic evolu-
tionary stability (e.g., Young, 1993) and direct study of the dynamic process (e.g., Kim & Sobel, 1995).
2 I.e., strategy σ is evolutionarily stable if (1) pi (σ, σ) ≥ pi (τ, σ) for each strategy τ , and (2) pi (σ, σ) = pi (τ, σ)
implies that pi (σ, τ) > pi (τ, τ). It is neutrally stable if the last inequality is replaced with a weak inequality.
3 Formally, evolutionary stability implies asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker; see
1
2Tab. 1: Payoff Matrix (pi) of a Symmetric Two-Player Coordination Game
a b c
a 3 0 0
b 0 2 0
c 0 0 1
Thomas (1985) extends the notion of stability from strategies to outcomes. A payoff profile
(outcome) β is evolutionarily stable if there exists a set of neutrally stable strategies such that
each strategy in the set (1) yields payoff β, and (2) is a strictly better reply to any other best
reply outside the set.4
Schlag (1993) and Banerjee & Weibull (2000) characterize stable outcomes of coordination
games with cheap talk. They show that if each player has only two actions and the alphabet is
large, then only approximately efficient outcomes are evolutionarily stable. However, if there are
more than two actions, then such games admit also inefficient evolutionarily stable strategies.5
Each such strategy must use all the messages in the alphabet with positive probability (otherwise,
the behavior against the unused messages “drifts” until it becomes favorable for mutants to
use these messages and play the Pareto-dominant action profile.) In particular, the following
strategy, σ∗, is evolutionarily stable in the game of Table 1: players send each message with
equal probability, and they play c if they have sent the same message and play b otherwise.6
DW’s Result. DW adapt the cheap-talk model by assuming that some messages have a pre-
specified meaning regarding the action that the sender intends to play, and that there are small
lying costs. These costs are modeled lexicographically: only when comparing two outcomes with
the same material payoffs (pi) do players care about the lying costs, and in this case, they prefer
the outcome with the smaller lying costs. DW (Prop. 1) show that this adaptation yields a
sharp prediction: the Pareto-dominant payoff is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome of the
lexicographic game (even when there are more than two actions). The intuition of this result
extensions to other payoff-monotonic dynamics in Cressman (1997); Sandholm (2010)): any sufficiently small
change in the composition of the population results in a movement back toward the evolutionarily stable strategy.
4 Formally, outcome β is evolutionarily stable if there exists a closed and non-empty set of strategies X,
such that each strategy σ ∈ X satisfies: (1) pi (σ, σ) = β, (2) neutral stability, and (3) for each strategy τ :
pi (σ, σ) = pi (τ, σ) and pi (σ, τ) = pi (τ, τ) imply that τ ∈ X . Thomas (1985) (see also Weibull, 1995) shows that
such sets are asymptotically stable.
5 Recently, Demichelis (2012) has shown that when players play long repeated coordination games (and not
single-shot coordination games as studied in most of the literature), then only efficient outcomes are evolutionarily
stable (even when there are more than two actions).
6 Similar to Schlag (1993), I use the reduced normal form in which a strategy does not specify what action a
player would take in the counter-factual case when he sends another message than the message specified by his
strategy. The results are similar in the alternative form (a` la DW) in which a strategy also specifies actions in
counter-factual cases. Specifically, the set of strategies that are equivalent to σ∗ (and only differ in counter-factual
cases) is an evolutionarily stable set (Thomas, 1985).
3is as follows. The lexicographic preferences imply that players cannot be indifferent between
two pure strategies that induce different lying probabilities. DW assume that the alphabet
contains a message φ that is always “truthful” and messages that “promise” to play specific
actions. Observe that in any Nash equilibrium at least one of the “promising messages” induces
a positive probability of lying. Thus, there must be unused messages in any Nash equilibrium
of the lexicographic game (DW, Lemma 3) and inefficient strategies, such as σ∗, cannot be
evolutionarily stable.7
Discontinuity and Stability. Samuelson & Swinkels (2003) argue that “lexicographic construc-
tions are interesting to the extent that they provide convenient approximations for cases in which
preferences are continuous, but some considerations are very much more important than oth-
ers.” Motivated by this view, I study whether DW’s lexicographic construction approximates
continuous preferences, and I show that the answer is negative: the prediction depends crucially
on the discontinuity of preferences. For each  > 0 define G as the coordination game with
communication in which the (continuous) payoff function is equal to pi (the material payoffs of
Table 1) minus  times the lying costs. Observe that for any sufficiently small  the game G
admits the following evolutionarily stable strategy σ: (1) at the second stage, players play as
in σ∗: c if they sent the same message and b otherwise, and (2) at the first stage, each message’s
probability of being sent is adjusted relative to the equal probabilities in σ∗: messages that yield
higher expected lying costs are sent with slightly lower probabilities, such that all messages yield
the same expected payoff in G given the play at the second stage.8 Thus, any continuous game
with small lying costs admits an evolutionarily stable strategy close to σ∗. Similarly, one can
show that every evolutionarily stable strategy of the cheap-talk game is a limit of evolutionarily
stable strategies in every converging sequence of games with continuous small lying costs.9
Finally, observe that various kinds of discontinuities (unrelated to lying costs) yield the same
7 DW’s notion of evolutionary stability implicitly assumes (a` la Volij, 2002) that the influence of mutants is
smaller than the influence of the lying costs. That is, if pi (τ, σ) = pi (σ, σ) and τ yields a higher lying cost,
then mutants who play τ cannot invade a population of incumbents who play σ even if the mutants obtain
higher material payoffs in any post-entry population (i.e., pi (τ, (1− ) · σ +  · τ) > pi (σ, (1− ) · σ +  · τ) for
each  > 0). Note that under the opposite assumption (i.e., mutants are more influential than lying costs, a` la
Binmore & Samuelson, 1992) the set of evolutionarily stable outcomes in the lexicographic game is the same as
in the cheap-talk game with no lying costs.
8 The formal argument why game G admits an evolutionarily stable strategy σ close to σ∗ is briefly sketched
as follows. Observe that strategy σ∗ is an isolated quasi-strong equilibrium (i.e., it assigns a positive probability to
every pure strategy that is a best-reply to σ∗), and this implies (Jansen, 1981) that σ∗ is an essential equilibrium
(i.e., all nearby continuous games admit an equilibrium close to σ∗). Thus, game G admits a nearby Nash
equilibrium σ. The quasi-strongness of σ∗ implies that for a sufficiently small , strategy σ has the same
support as σ∗. Finally, minor adaptations to the proofs of Schlag (1993) and Banerjee & Weibull (2000) (which
show why σ∗ is evolutionarily stable in G0) imply that σ is evolutionarily stable in G.
9 Moreover, this result holds regardless of the relative magnitude of the lying costs and the mutation barriers
(as defined in Samuelson & Swinkels, 2003).
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sharp prediction as DW. For example, assume that there are two messages in the alphabet,m and
m′, such that m′ is slightly harder to pronounce than m and bears an additional lexicographic
“pronunciation cost.” This discontinuity implies that these two messages cannot both be used in
any equilibrium, and hence only efficient outcomes are stable. Thus, discontinuous preferences
induce efficiency in coordination games with communication, whereas continuous small lying
costs do not influence the set of stable outcomes.
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